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Introduction 
Accounting objectives should be based on economies of information, i.e., 
cost and benefit considerations.1 If accounting information were a commodity 
sold at the market clearing price, it could be argued that forces of market 
equilibrium could insure that accounting information would be produced and 
communicated at an optimum level consistent with equating the marginal 
methods and benefits and marginal costs of information. However, account-
ing information does not constitute a "private good" in the sense of ex-
changeability at the marketplace; rather, it is provided without charge by the 
firm to the consumers—in this case, the various users of accounting infor-
mation.2 Under these circumstances, the determination of the costs and 
1 Theoretically, the benefit of information is measured by the consequences of 
decision changes that occur as a result of the information. The cost of information 
is the value of resources committed to obtaining and communicat ing it. 
2 The aspects of private goods vs. public goods and the implications of optimal 
condit ions of welfare as well as the underlying factors in determining what constitutes 
public goods are extensively discussed in the literature. For a good example, see 
Harold Demsetz, "Some Aspects of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics 
(October 1966), pp. 61-70. What makes accounting information in particular a 
public good is probably the difficulty in guaranteeing exclusive access to the in-
formation if it is sold. 
It could be argued that accounting information is indirectly sold at the market 
in that it is used in the determination of stock prices and thus an implicit price is 
stated through stock price movements. Notice, however, that this process is very 
indirect (unlike intermediate products which have established market prices) and 
is influenced by the uncertainty of the resulting benefit that would potentially accrue 
to the firm through provision of information. By contrast, in respect to private goods, 
firms are generally price takers in the context of a competitive market, and thus 
subject to much less uncertainties than in the case of accounting information. More 
elaborate discussion of this aspect appears later in the paper. 
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benefits must be made outside the market system. 
Although both costs and benefits need to be investigated, it is probably 
advisable first to identify the benefits of different kinds of information.3 Even 
when the cost of some accounting information is prohibitive, the search for 
alternative means of obtaining the information could be justified if the bene-
fits are large enough. Failure to consider some accounting information merely 
because its cost is high cannot be justified. 
There are various ways to investigate the benefits which could lead to 
identifying desirable accounting information: 
1. The information required by normative decision models of major 
user groups could be determined. 
2. Decision models actually used by major user groups could be iden-
tified through interviews, controlled experiments, etc., and their information 
requirements determined. These decision models could either agree with or 
differ (as a result of universal behavioral tendencies) from the normative 
models. 
3. Preferences of users as to different kinds of accounting information 
could be identified through interviews and questionnaires. 
While all three avenues should be followed4 primary emphasis should 
be placed first on information requirements of normative models because: 
1. The normative model is the procedure that a rational man follows in 
making a particular decision in a specified set of circumstances. Consensus 
among writers regarding the soundness of normative models indicates that a 
majority of users is likely to follow the normative model. Thus, the benefit of 
information used in the model would accrue to many users and the sum total 
of the benefits resulting from providing the information is apt to be large. 
2. Normative models can serve as a standard of reference to evaluate 
actual decision models. If deviations are found, to be systematic and uni-
versal across many individuals, the deviations could be used to modify the 
3 While there is a lower limit for costs (zero), the upper limit for benefits is 
indefinite. Thus, while costly information may not be eliminated from consideration 
(since the benefits could be even larger), information that has small benefit could 
be eliminated from consideration since the cost is bound to be positive. Starting 
the investigation with the benefits allows an eventually smaller subset of information 
to be considered and therefore saves research time and effort. 
4 The implication of the findings of the three avenues to the objectives may be 
inconsistent. Decisions as to whether (a) the normative model should be modified 
to accommodate systematic inconsistencies, (b) information should be provided 
so as to satisfy presently used models without paying attention to normative con-
siderations or (c) individuals should be trained or otherwise influenced to follow the 
normative models would have to be made. Unless all avenues are followed, however, 
such inconsistencies may remain unidentified. 
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normative model. Normative models are selected as a standard of reference 
since they are consistent with action or behavior that is generally found to be 
empirically valid. 
3. Accounting objectives inferred from expressed preferences of indi-
vidual users would be varied and would lead to a great number of sub-
objectives.5 Criteria would ultimately have to be developed to narrow the 
resulting multitude of objectives so that the accounting alternatives to be 
considered would be limited to a feasible subset. The criteria would be 
implied by prevalent normative decision models. It would be advisable to 
conduct inquiries into individual preferences in light of the requirements of 
the normative models. 
Benefits Identified Through the Analysis of 
Normative Decision Models 
If it can be determined that many decisions frequently made by more 
than one user utilize the same piece of information under a relatively large 
set of circumstances, then the sum total of these benefits may well exceed 
the cost of providing that information systematically. Thus, it is useful to 
identify distinct sets of decisions for which information requirements are 
relatively common and for which the relationships among the information 
used, the resulting decisions, and the consequences are relatively stable. Once 
these commonalities are discovered, the benefits would then be compared 
with the costs of systematically reporting the common information within the 
accounting system. 
Although individual users of accounting information have a multitude of 
goals and types of decisions, the broad objective of the economy as a whole 
is defined to be the efficient allocation of resources.6 
5 For example, consider the set of objectives that can be inferred from the ex-
pressed preference of an individual to be provided information on replacement costs. 
Some objectives that can be induced from this expressed preference and that are 
consistent with it (to mention only a few): (a) the wish to know the cost of repro-
ducing the firm and its operations, (b) assessing managerial ability to maximize 
holding gains and minimize holding losses, (c) evaluating the managerial decisions 
with respect to t iming of asset purchases, (d) judging the firm's future ability to 
f inance its operation if it were to replace its existing assets and thus assess its 
chances for survival, etc. From these objectives numerous higher level objectives 
could be induced, such as the prediction of future holding gains or losses (inferred 
from objective (b) above), assessing future managerial ability to maneuver and capi-
talize on new opportunities ( induced from both objectives (b) and (c) above), and 
evaluating the l ikelihood of default and material losses as a result of ceasing the 
firm's operations (inferred from objective (d) above). 
6 This includes the efficient allocation of resources within the firm as one part of 
the economy, and it thus implies the provision of information to control and motivate 
actions within the firm to insure efficient allocation of the firm's resources. 
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When this objective is pursued within a private enterprise system in 
which it is assumed that individuals seek to maximize their wealth, the 
accounting objectives must be formulated so that the use of accounting 
information by individuals to maximize their wealth causes resources to be 
allocated most efficiently in the economy.7 Therefore, we need to study 
decision models used by individuals to maximize their wealth. Inasmuch as 
it is unrealistic to discuss the multitude of decision models that vary across 
decisions and individuals, we must attempt to classify decisions into groups 
that are homogeneous in their information requirements. 
There are two primary classes of decisions generally made by individual 
consumers within the private sector of the economy: consumption decisions 
and investment decisions. The groups of decisions are interdependent. This 
discussion assumes a predetermined level of consumption as given and con-
siders investment decisions only. While different groups of decisions may 
require different information, there are many commonalities in information 
required for making investment decisions. 
Predictability and Comparability. Estimating the future levels of variables 
relevant to an investment decision is the basis for making the decision. For 
example, a decision to purchase a machine is based on an estimate of cash 
flows generated by it. The cash flows from an equity security are the divi-
dends that will be received while the security is held plus the market value 
of the security when it is sold. Since it is always necessary to predict rele-
vant variables to make investment decisions,8 one of the primary objectives 
of accounting is to facilitate the prediction of relevant variables. And indeed 
this objective has been extensively discussed in the literature in terms of 
the "predictive ability criterion."9 
In addition, investment decisions are not made in a void; they usually 
are made in the context of choice among alternative competing activities. 
Thus, given a particular level of wealth, the primary decision is how to allo-
cate that wealth among competing investment alternatives. Under these con-
ditions the task is to compare the estimates of future relevant variables of the 
7 Whether there are market forces which lead to optimal allocation as a result 
of individual actions or whether there are possible sub-optimalit ies that necessitate 
information regulation is discussed in Joshua Ronen, "The Need for Account ing 
Objectives in an Efficient Market," contained in this volume, pp. 36-52. 
8 Note that most of the current and noncurrent economic decisions in a firm can 
be viewed as investment decisions. Thus, an investment in a human resource is 
expected to generate services and therefore cash flows in the future. Advertising 
expenses that are related to public relations activities of the firm are no different. 
9 W . H. Beaver, J. W. Kennelly, and W. M. Voss, "Predict ive Ability as a Criterion 
for the Evaluation of Account ing Data," Accounting Review (October 1968), pp. 
675-683. 
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investment alternatives and to choose that alternative promising the highest 
expected benefits. Comparability among the investment alternatives therefore 
needs to be specified as another important objective for accounting reports. 
The Investment Model: Risk and Return. Stating the objectives of pre-
dictability and comparability is not sufficient. To make statements about 
the specific content of accounting reports, we must also specify what objects 
are to be predicted and compared. For example, predictability of future 
accounting income may be useful in satisfying the comparability criterion 
only to the extent that accounting income is the dimension along which 
different firms or their securities should be compared and ranked.10 
As the normative investment model most generally used is the one 
based on portfolio analysis, it can thus be used as a basis to determine 
desirable accounting output. But the portfolio model should not be viewed 
narrowly, irrespective of the role of securities in the capital market in effi-
ciently allocating the ownership of the economy's capital stock. Under 
equilibrium conditions, the savings made available through voluntary deci-
sions on postponement of consumption must be invested in the best com-
bination of securities, i.e., the combinations that produce the highest incre-
ment in social wealth (where wealth is understood to incorporate individual 
preferences of investors). 
The Relationship with Economy-Wide Goals. To provide appropriate 
signals for optimal resource allocation, there must be an environment in 
which firms can make production and investment decisions and in which 
investors are able to choose among the securities that represent ownership 
of the firms' activities on the assumption that security prices "fully reflect" 
all available information. It is precisely because the empirical research re-
lated to the operations of the efficient markets supports the contention that 
10 For a discussion of the impropriety of setting merely the predictability of 
accounting profit as a criterion, see Lawrence Revsine, "Predictive Ability, Market 
Prices, and Operating Flows," Accounting Review (July 1971), pp. 480-489. Any 
income is an artifact produced by a set of rules or "general ly accepted accounting 
pr inciples." It is quite plausible that accounting income could be a better predictor 
of future accounting income (which is measured on the basis of the same rules and 
conventions) than a measure of income reported on the basis of other measurements 
and rules such as current operating income, exit value income, etc. In fact, two recent 
studies support this contention. (See John K. Simmons and Jack Gray, "An Investi-
gation of the Effect of Differing Accounting Frameworks on the Prediction of Net 
Income," Accounting Review (October 1969), pp. 757-776, and Frank Werner, "A 
Study of Predictive Significance of Two Income Measures," Journal of Accounting 
Research (Spring 1969), pp. 123-136.) The real question is whether future accounting 
income is the proper measure to be forecasted to form the basis of comparison 
among firms and whether there are other measures either replacing or in addition 
to the historical accounting income that better serve that purpose. 
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security prices "fully reflect" available information at any t ime" that the 
portfolio model is an appropriate basis for determining the objects to be 
predicted using accounting numbers. This is so because the objects to be 
predicted from the normative viewpoint must also be utilized to become 
legitimate objects of accounting. 
Since security prices have been found to "reflect fully" all publicly held 
information and to react unbiasedly to new information, they can be said to 
reflect the intrinsic or "fundamental" value of the securities.12 But, for 
security prices to serve as appropriate signals for optimal resource allocation, 
the intrinsic value of the stock must coincide with the economic value of the 
firm, which is defined as the risk-adjusted discounted value of the firm's 
prospective cash receipts and disbursements.13 Unless the security's intrinsic 
value coincides with the economic value of the firm, allocation of resources 
in the economy is sub-optimal since the marginal cost of capital would not 
be equal to the marginal expected rate of return. Thus, Pareto optimality 
conditions are violated.14 
11 For an extensive review, see the following: 
Eugene F. Fama, "Eff icient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," 
Journal of Finance (May 1970), pp. 383-417; "The Behavior of Stock Market Prices," 
Journal of Business (January 1965), pp. 34-105; and "Random Walks in Stock 
Market Prices," Financial Analysts Journal (September-October 1965), pp. 55-59. 
Eugene F. Fama, L. Fisher, M. C. Jensen, and Richard Roll, "The Adjustment of Stock 
Prices to New Information," International Economic Review (February 1969), pp. 1-21. 
Benoit Mandelbrot, "The Variation of Certain Speculative Prices," Journal of Business 
(October 1963), pp. 394-419, and "Forecasts of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets 
and 'Martingale' Models," Journal of Business (January 1966), pp. 242-255. 
Richard Roll, "The Efficient Market Model Appl ied to U.S. Treasury Bill Rates" (Un-
published Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1968). 
Paul A. Samuelson, "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," 
Industrial Management Review (Spring 1965), pp. 41-49. 
Myron Scholes, "A Test of the Competitive Market Hypothesis: The Market for New 
Issues and Secondary Offerings" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 
1969). 
Roger N. Waud, "Publ ic Interpretation of Discount Rate Changes: Evidence on the 
'Announcement Effect'," Econometrica (March 1970), pp. 231-250. 
12 As defined in Joshua Ronen and George H. Sorter, "Relevant Account ing," 
Journal of Business (April 1972), pp. 258-282, intrinsic value is the value that encom-
passes in an unbiased fashion all the relevant determinants of an entity. These 
intrinsic values depend on the earnings prospects of a company which in turn are 
related to economic and other factors some of which are peculiar to this company 
and some of which affect other companies as well (see Fama, "Behavior of Stock 
Market Prices," p. 36). 
1 3 S e e Eugene F. Fama and Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), chap. 4, and M. H. Miller and F. Modigl iani, 
"Div idend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of Shares," Journal of Business (October 
1961), pp. 411-433. 
14 For a discussion of Pareto optimality condit ions, see, for example, E. J. Mishan, 
"A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959," Economic Journal (1960). 
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If the portfolio model is used in making investment decisions that result 
in the determination of stock prices, then for optimal resource allocation, the 
information inputs utilized in the models should best reflect the economic 
value of the firm, i.e., the prospective cash flows and their risks.15 Stated 
another way, assuming that the portfolio model is used by investors and given 
that (a) security prices should reflect the economic value of the firm and (b) 
that security prices fully reflect the available information and unbiasedly and 
instantaneously adjust to new information, the primary objective of account-
ing emerges as providing information that facilitates the prediction of pro-
spective cash flows and their risks.16 The derivation of this objective is shown 
schematically in Figure 1, opposite. 
Reliability. Although predictability and comparability are two necessary 
ingredients (or sub-objectives) of the process of assessing future flows 
and their uncertainties, predicted and comparable flows and their uncertainties 
should not and probably will not be used if they are unreliable. Thus, relia-
bility is an objective that is deduced from the higher level objectives in the 
hierarchy and is presented as a third sub-sub-objective in Figure 1. 
Perhaps reliability can best be defined through its elements. Many 
factors can contribute to the reliability of information. One is whether the 
information resulted from a consensus about a value or an event that is 
contestable. The magnitude that results from the consensus would be more 
reliable than if the consensus involved noncontesting parties. For example, 
market prices result from the consensus arrived at by buyers and sellers. 
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15 The informational inputs to the portfolio model (which generally assumes that 
returns on stock are normally distributed) consists of (a) the one period return on 
securities which is defined as: 
r i t = d j t / P j t + (P j, t+1 - P j t ) / P j t . 
where r J t is the return on the security during time period t, d J t is the dividend payment 
during time period t, P j , t + 1 is the price of security at the end of time t, and p j t is its 
price at the beginning of time t, and (b) the risk associated with the expected return 
which is generally measured as a standard deviation of the normally distributed 
return, although other investigators [e.g., see Fama "Behavior of Stock Market 
Prices," Maurice G. Kendall, "The Analysis of Economic Time-Series, Part I: Prices," 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, XCVI (1953), pp. 11-25; Benoit Mandelbrot, 
"Variation of Certain Speculative Prices"; Arnold Moore, "A Statistical Analysis of 
Common Stock Prices," (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Graduate School of Business, 
University of Chicago, (1962)); M.F.M. Osborne, "Brownian Motion in the Stock 
Market," Operations Research (March-Apri l , 1959), pp. 145-173; S. James Press, 
"A Compound Events Model for Security Prices," Journal of Business (July 1968), 
pp. 317-335; and Richard Roll, "Efficient Market Model Appl ied to U.S. Treasury Bill 
Rates" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago (1968)] tested a broader 
class of distributions and, in particular, the class of stable Paretian or Pareto-Levy 
distributions which include the normal distribution as a special case. 
16 Clearly, it can be argued that this information need not necessarily be provided 
by the firm (either through its accounting system or otherwise). This particular point 
as well as the interesting question of whether market forces exist that guarantee the 
provision of this information without the necessity of formulating accounting objec-
tives is discussed by Ronen, "Need for Account ing Objectives in an Efficient Market." 
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Figure 1 
RELIABILITY 
Sellers wish to obtain as high a price as possible for the commodity sold; 
buyers wish to pay as little as possible. When these contesting parties come 
to a consensus as reflected in market prices, the market prices can be said 
to be reliable estimates of the future utility and benefits of the commodity. 
The ability to validate information or magnitude of events is another 
element of reliability. The magnitude of events such as forecasts can be 
validated through comparing the forecasts with actual occurrences over 
time. Future forecasts would be considered to be more reliable if the devia-
tions between past forecasts and actual results are small. Information can 
also be validated through the ability to verify the magnitudes in question. 
Verifiability can be obtained either through visibility of the magnitudes, for 
example, through actual cash transactions, or through documentation of the 
magnitude, as by a legal contract or court decision. The sub-objectives 
relating to reliability are depicted in Figure 2, page 88. 
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Figure 2 
Benefits Obtained Through Actions Made Possible by Steps Required 
in Providing Information. The process of providing information yields two 
types of benefits. One type results f rom using the information; the other 
results from the actions of individuals motivated by the mere necessity to 
provide the information. The necessity to provide the information may cause 
actions that are either beneficial or harmful to the efficient al location of 
resources. The mere provision of information may facil itate the control and 
coordinat ion of factors of product ion ( including the f irm's labor force) and 
goal congruence (conformity of the actions of the f i rm's personnel with the 
goal of the firm as a whole). The data required for providing information may 
also be used to trace the actions of the various employees of the firm and to 
facil itate control. From the sub-object ives of control, coordinat ion and con-
gruence we can deduce the need for providing forecasts and budgets to 
coordinate future activities and also the need to keep a record of actual 
events for compar ison with forecasts. 
For optimal al location of the f irm's resources, managers and employees 
need to have profit maximization as a goal. This motivation can be faci l i tated 
both by the preparation of budgets and subsequent compar ison of results 
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with budgets,17 and also by compensation of the firm's personnel at amounts 
that equal their marginal productivity. From this latter objective we again 
derive the need to record actual events and performance. For the forecasts 
to be effective in producing desired benefits both within the firm and outside 
of it, internal and external forecasts should be the same. This aspect of the 
benefits of providing accounting information is schematically depicted in 
Figure 3, page 90. 
Timeliness and Availability of Accounting Information. To optimize re-
source allocation, it is also desirable to minimize the time lags between the 
point at which new information about expected cash flows and their uncer-
tainties first become known and the point at which allocation decisions are 
made. The faster that new information is made available, the shorter the 
time lapse until the decision is made and consequently, the shorter the 
period during which the economy's capital is not optimally allocated. There-
fore, information on expected cash flows and their uncertainties should be 
disseminated as fast as possible once it becomes known. This constitutes 
the sub-objective of timeliness derived in Figure 4, page 91. How fast 
information should be disseminated and the frequency of the dissemination 
depend on the cost/benefit relationships. 
To allocate resources optimally, it is also necessary to maximize the 
number of individuals who possess information on expected cash flows and 
their uncertainty about different firms. The wider the dissemination of knowl-
edge about alternative combinations of risk and return relative to different 
securities, the more likely are resources to be channeled to their best use as 
a result of competitive bids for the more profitable securities. Accordingly 
the sub-objective of wide public dissemination of accounting information is 
derived in Figure 4. 
Information for Social Goals 
Another derivative of the objective of optimally allocating resources 
within the economy consistent with private maximization of wealth is the need 
to equate marginal social cost and benefits with marginal private cost and 
benefits. Loosely speaking, where the actions of the firm affect only its own 
costs and benefits there would be no divergence between private values 
(costs and benefits) and social values. In this case, the decision and actions 
taken in pursuit of the firm's own interests will result in the optimization of 
both private wealth and the economy's wealth. Where the actions of an 
individual firm do affect, however, the consequences of other firms' or indi-
17 Budgets may have a beneficial effect in motivating the work force, but they 
could also reduce motivation as a result of the manner in which they are generated 
and their magnitude. The behavioral link between the preparation of budgets and 
ultimate productivity is complex. For a discussion of this issue, see Joshua Ronen 
and J. Leslie Livingstone, "An Expectancy Theory Approach to the Motivational 
Impacts of Budgets" (Unpublished manuscript, The University of Toronto, 1973). 
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Figure 3 
viduals' actions, then pursuing only private benefits may not result in the 
optimization of social benefits or in an efficient allocation of resources. In 
this case, an accounting objective that is restricted to the consideration of 
private benefits and costs may require the communication of data that will 
not meet the social objectives. 
It is possible that private profit maximization by a firm will also bring 
about an efficient allocation of resources, even when the firm's actions 
directly affect the consequences of other firms' actions. This would be the 
case when the firm takes into account these effects before it makes its 
decisions. If the firm is to maximize its profits in the most rigorous sense, 
it must take into consideration the effect of its actions on other firms or 
individuals. These effects fall within the normal economic definition of oppor-
tunity costs and should therefore be explicitly considered along with other 
costs in making rational decisions. Reflecting opportunity costs make it 
possible for accounting report users to properly assess managerial per-
90 
OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY: INFORMATION BENEFITS 
BENEFITS OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE 
OF INFORMATION FOR DECISIONS 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION: 
ECONOMY LEVEL 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION: 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
MINIMIZATION 
OF TIME LAPSE UNTIL 
ALLOCATION DECISIONS 
ARE MADE 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
FUTURE RISK AND 
RETURN ASSOCIATED 
WITH FIRMS' ACTIVITIES 
EXPANDING THE NUMBER 
OF POTENTIAL COMPETITIVE 
BIDS ON ALTERNATIVE 
SECURITY INVESTMENTS 
TIMELINESS: 
DISSEMINATION OF 
INFORMATION 
WHEN FIRST KNOWN 
Figure 4 
WIDE PUBLIC 
DISSEMINATION OF 
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
formance. But, in addition, if income figures that result from actual past 
transactions are deemed to be at all important (both in providing a record 
of actual past transactions to fulfill the stewardship function of accounting as 
well as in providing the means to validate past managerial expectations), it 
is evident that these opportunity costs should be treated in the same manner 
as other production costs. 
The issue becomes more complex when the effect of the firm's actions 
on others is not or cannot be adequately considered when making decisions 
within the firm. This would be the case, for example, when the price mecha-
nism of the market, which enables the firm to consider such facts directly 
in its decisions, either does not exist or is too costly. Operationally, this 
means that transaction costs such as conducting negotiations, drawing up 
contracts and inspection are higher than the benefits of adjusting the firm's 
actions on the basis of the expected effects of these actions on other entities. 
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In this case, pursuing private interests will not lead the firm to bring about a 
socially desirable allocation of resources, and governmental intervention, 
through the legal determination of rights, regulations, and policing, may 
eventually become necessary.18 Indeed, because of its power, the govern-
ment may be able to bring about corrective action at a lower cost than would 
a private organization. Although the governmental machine may be extremely 
costly, it may be the alternative to private action. Under these circumstances, 
the gathering and communication of information about social costs are 
desirable even in the absence of a potential solution at the private level 
because: 
1. The communication of such information may (subject to the deter-
mination that the information is best processed by the firm creating the harm-
ful side activity) lead to a proper kind of governmental intervention that 
achieves efficient allocation of resources, also indicating that such informa-
tion should be helpful in determining which of the alternative social arrange-
ments is optimal for dealing with the externality. 
2. On the assumption that an efficient market would eventually lead to 
desirable social action, the communication of information about the cost to 
the firm that will probably be associated with whatever social arrangement 
emerges will provide the user of financial statements with better means to 
appraise the future prospects of the firm. 
In Figure 5, opposite, the sub-objective of equating marginal private 
costs and benefits with marginal social costs and benefits is therefore indi-
cated as a derivative of the optimal resource allocation within the economy, 
consistent with the optimal allocation at the individual level. Any divergences 
between marginal private costs and benefits and marginal social costs and 
benefits need to be reliably predicted and compared among firms. This need 
is reflected in Figure 6, fold-out, by an arrow connecting the objective of 
equating the private values with social values to the sub-objectives of pre-
dictability, comparability and reliability. 
The sub-objectives developed so far from the overall objective of optimal 
resource allocation (individual and economy-wide levels) can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Providing information about future risk and return associated with 
the firm's security: This leads to the requirement of information about future 
cash flows and their uncertainty. 
2. Timeliness: Dissemination of information when first known in order 
to minimize the time lapse until allocation decisions are made. 
18 For a more lucid discussion of this issue, see R. H. Coase, "The Problem of 
Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Also, for a more detailed 
treatment of the accounting implications of social costs and benefits, see Joshua 
Ronen, "Account ing for Social Costs and Benefits," contained in this volume, pp. 
317-340. 
92 
OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY: INFORMATION BENEFITS 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: 
ECONOMY LEVEL 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION: 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
MINIMIZATION OF 
TIME LAPSE UNTIL 
ALLOCATION 
DECISIONS ARE MADE 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
FUTURE RISK AND RETURN 
ASSOCIATED WITH 
FIRMS' ACTIVITIES 
EQUATING MARGINAL PRIVATE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS WITH MARGINAL 4-
SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
EXPANDING THE 
NUMBER OF 
POTENTIAL 
COMPETITIVE BIDS 
ON ALTERNATIVE 
SECURITY 
INVESTMENTS 
Figure 5 
3. Wide dissemination of information to expand the number of com-
petitive bids on alternative security investments. 
4. Providing information about divergences between marginal private 
costs and benefits and marginal social costs and benefits. 
From the objective of providing information on future cash flows and 
uncertainty, the sub-objectives of predictability, comparability and reliability 
were derived. That is, the accounting objectives so far can be summarized 
as the timely and wide dissemination of information that enables users to 
reliably predict and compare expected cash flows and their uncertainty, as 
well as predicting and comparing divergences between private and social 
values across firms. 
Elements of Predictability and Comparability. Elements of predictability 
and comparability are diverse and could vary in their degree of importance 
depending upon the firm's circumstances. However, some general guidelines 
can be developed as sub-objectives derived from predictability and com-
parability. Figure 6 which reflects the total hierarchy of objectives and sub-
objectives (and which incorporates Figures 1 through 5) depicts the develop-
ment of the predictability and comparability elements. 
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Prediction can be facilitated if the events that are to be predicted can 
be associated with other events or dimensions which are either known or 
more easily predicted.19 The most obvious information that helps predict 
future events is a record of the past occurrences of that event. Past occur-
rences of an event could be extrapolated into the future in accordance with 
simple rules (at the rudimentary level of analysis) or through use of a more 
formal and rigorous prediction model (e.g., time series analysis).20 Thus, 
we derive the sub-objective of providing information on past cash flows to 
improve the prediction of expected flows. 
Secondly, fluctuations in the firm's volume of output may explain varia-
tions in some of the costs. Therefore, knowledge of (or estimate of) future 
output volume may well facilitate the prediction of future levels of cost with 
more accuracy than if the nature of the association between volume of output 
and costs was either not known or not disclosed. Since costs fixed relative 
to output will occur at about the same magnitude and costs that are variable 
in relation to output will tend to fluctuate,21 providing information separately 
about these fixed and variable costs may make possible a better prediction 
of future costs. 
Certainly, output is not the only dimension or variable with which the 
movement of costs or any other variables that are to be predicted can be 
associated. Association can be made with inputs, with activities such as 
product lines and segments of firms, etc.22 In addition, present practice 
19This is the primary motivation for the common regression analysis. See, for 
example, George Benston, "Mult ip le Regression Analysis of Cost Behavior," Account-
ing Review (October 1966), pp. 657-672, and Robert Jensen, "Mult ip le Regression 
Models for Cost Control—Assumptions and Limitations," Accounting Review (April 
1967), pp. 265-272. 
20 For example, several studies revealed that accounting income could be a better 
predictor of itself, that is, of accounting income (if the latter is obtained through the 
same system of rules and measurement as the former) than the other types of income 
(such as replacement cost income). Also, studies under way explore the statistical 
properties of time series of events to develop criteria for improving predictions. 
Thus, providing information about cash flows may help improve the prediction of 
future cash flows either directly or through the development of such criteria. 
21 See, for example, R. S. Gynther, " Improving Separation of Fixed and Variable 
Expenses," NAA Bulletin (June 1963), pp. 29-39, and National Association of 
Accountants, Account ing Practice Report No. 10, "Separating and Using Costs as 
Fixed and Variable," NAA Bulletin (June 1960). 
22 The objective of associability leads (when associabil ity is made with product 
lines) to the separate reporting by product lines and segments that is the subject 
of much debate now. Clearly, the degree to which such information is to be reported 
on product lines is the subject of research into the cost of this form of reporting. 
Part of the cost may be the reduced motivation and ability to generate profits through 
revealing information beneficial to competitors. This latter occurrence would violate 
the objective of motivation and the sub-object ive of the equality of reward with the 
individual marginal product that appears elsewhere in the hierarchy as discussed 
above. 
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suggests that the associability of costs with manufacturing and selling and 
administrative functions may motivate the separate reporting of costs by 
functions. Predictability seems to be the implicit objective that accountants 
have in mind when they disclose the underlying components such as revenue, 
cost of sales, and operating expenses, which determine the resulting net 
income figure. In fact, recent evidence suggests that separate components 
of the income measurement process may be better forecasted than net in-
come itself which is an algebraic sum of the components. Thus, firms were 
found to be able to forecast revenues, for example, with more accuracy and 
precision than net income.23 
The Time Dimension. One of the major dimensions with which events 
are generally associated and which is important in prediction is the time 
dimension. Events that are associated with time are said to be recurring 
events. Those which are not associated with time are called non-recurring 
events. The items that are generally grouped as operating expenses and 
operating revenues tend to be recurring items, whereas the non-recurring 
items are usually labeled as extraordinary revenue or expense items. Predic-
tion on the basis of a series of past events is made with less errors if the 
process that generates these events and their measures is well defined and 
stable. The firm's return is generally the aggregate of many and different 
processes. When prediction is based on a separate component, each identi-
fiable with a particular generating process, it is apt to be more accurate than 
when it is based on an aggregate measure that obscures the underlying 
relationship. Thus, better prediction is presumably made possible by ana-
lyzing the time trend of income generated by recurring events more than by 
analyzing a trend of income that results from both recurring operations and 
less stable processes. Therefore, disaggregation of events along the dimen-
sion of recurrability becomes another criterion that facilitates prediction. 
Discriminability Among Information Sources. Associability of events of 
interest with past events or past dimensions is not the only criterion that 
may facilitate the improvement of prediction. An important element in 
facilitating prediction is obtaining estimates (even though subjective) from 
people who may possess information about the future that makes their own 
prediction of future relevant events an important input into the predictions 
of the users of financial statements. The persons who may have some 
knowledge about the future are likely to be the firm's management. 
As indicated earlier, the object of prediction is expected future cash 
flows and the uncertainty associated with them. But both the cash flows and 
their uncertainty depend on the specific plans and actions which are affected 
by and first known to the management of firms. Since such plans are de-
23 See R. A. Daily, "The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information," The 
Accounting Review (October 1971), pp. 686-692. 
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signed to give the firm a competitive edge, they are bound to have significant 
informational content.24 
Because a firm's management is the first to know its plans, timely fore-
casts may prove to be a valuable input to the users of financial statements 
in predicting future cash flows. Management is in the best position to assess 
the effects that its specific plans (unknown to others unless communicated) 
have on future cash flows. It would therefore seem desirable for management 
to communicate its expectations concerning these cash flows.25 Managers, 
however, are not infallible. Expectations based on their plans may diverge 
from actual results because of the randomness of the underlying events or 
different interpretations of future events by managers and the market. The 
difference in interpretation may exist because of two major factors that affect 
future cash flows: (a) market and industry events that affect all the firms— 
exogenous factors, and (b) the particular performance of the firm in question, 
that is, the specific plans or resources, employment decisions made by man-
agement, etc. These specific firm decisions are responsible for whether the 
firm accumulates more or less value than the industry or the market. These 
are the endogenous factors. 
Exogenous factors, contrary to the endogenous, are primarily beyond 
the firm's control. They may be predicted by relying on the market's expecta-
tions as reflected in market prices, but the best source for predicting endo-
genous factors is probably the firm's management. Thus, the dimension of 
controllability of events becomes an important criterion in facilitating pre-
diction.26 The dimension of controllability facilitates prediction not only 
directly through identifying the source from which expectations are to be 
obtained—market transactions and market prices for the exogenous factors 
and management's forecasts for the endogenous factors—but it also facili-
tates prediction through enabling users to assess managerial performance. 
Clearly, the past ability of management to forecast, perform and carry out 
24 This is generally information that is not currently and systematically made 
widely available to the market. Some evidence on this is provided by Scholes, "Test 
of the Competitive Market Hypothesis," who found that corporate insiders often have 
monopolist ic access to information about their firms which if made available would 
contribute to a better allocation of resources (see Ronen, "Need for Account ing 
Objectives in an Efficient Market"). 
25 Notice that the detailed plans themselves do not have to be made available, 
only the management expectations concerning cash flows which are contingent 
on these plans. Consequently, there should be no reluctance by management, out 
of fear of leakage to competitors, to reflect this information. 
26 A perfectly competitive firm does not possess any particular advantages that 
allow it to affect its output price by varying its supply and will therefore not earn 
more than the normal rate of return. It can be said then that the firm's increment 
in its wealth is determined entirely by exogenous market and industry factors. A 
monopolistic firm possesses a unique asset (skilled labor force, managerial know-
how) that enables it to affect the price of its differentiated product. In this case, the 
firm can be said to bring its endogenous variables to bear on its output price aside 
from the industry-wide exogenous factors, and it can thus produce higher than a 
normal rate of return. 
96 
BENEFITS OBTAINED THROUGH ACTIONS 
CAUSED BY THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY: INFORMATION BENEFITS 
BENEFITS OBTAINED THROUGH T H E 
USE OF INFORMATION FOR DECISIONS 
Figure 6 
EFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
WITHIN THE FIRM 
MOTIVATION CONTROL, COORDINATION 
AND GOAL CONGRUENCE 
ACHIEVEMENT OF 
FORECASTS AND BUDGETS 
MINIMIZATION OF 
TIME LAPSE UNTIL 
ALLOCATION 
DECISIONS ARE MADE 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE 
- ALLOCATION: 
ECONOMY L E V E L 
RISK AND RETURN TO REFLECT 
F U N D A M E N T A L WEALTH INCREMENT 
OPTIMAL RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION: 
INDIVIDUAL L E V E L 
(3) FORECASTS AND 
BUDGETS 
(4) ACTUAL 
EVENTS 
COMPENSATION AND OTHER 
REWARDS MUST EQUAL 
MARGINAL PRODUCT 
RECORD OF ACTUAL 
PERFORMANCE 
(3) FORECASTS AND 
BUDGETS 
CONSISTENCY OF 
FORECASTS WITH THOSE 
E X T E R N A L L Y REPORTED 
(4) SCOREKEEPING: 
RECORD OF ACTUAL 
EVENTS 
i 
TIMELINESS: 
DISSEMINATION OF 
INFORMATION 
WHEN FIRST KNOWN 
INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE RISK 
AND RETURN ASSOCIATED 
WITH FIRMS' SECURITIES 
INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE CASH 
FLOWS AND THE UNCERTAINTY 
ASSOCIATED WITH THEM 
EQUATING MARGINAL 
PRIVATE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
WITH MARGINAL SOCIAL 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
EXPANDING THE NUMBER OF 
POTENTIAL COMPETITIVE BIDS 
ON ALTERNATIVE 
SECURITY INVESTMENTS 
PREDICTABILITY 
WIDE PUBLIC DISSEMINATION 
OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
COMPARABILITY 
COMPARISON 
AND ANALYSIS 
I 
ASSESSABILITY OF 
MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE 
(2) CONTROLLABILITY OF EVENTS 
CONTESTABILITY 
+ 
(1)MARKET 
PRICES 
(EXIT AND 
ENTRY) 
RELIABILITY 
VALIDABILITY 
VERIFIABILITY 
COMPARISON WITH ACTUAL 
EVENTS OVER TIME 
RECORD OF ACTUAL EVENTS 
(CASH FLOWS, ACQUISITIONS, 
OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, ETC.) VISIBILITY DOCUMENTABILITY 
ASSOCIABILITY WITH PREDICTABLE 
EVENTS OR DIMENSIONS 
WITH THE EVENT ITSELF: PAST 
OCCURRENCES, PAST CASH FLOWS 
WITH TIME: RECURRABILITY 
DISTINGUISHABILITY AMONG RECURRING 
AND NON-RECURRING EVENTS 
IDENTIFIABILITY OF POTENTIALLY 
USEFUL INFORMATION SOURCES 
4 
(2) CONTROLLABILITY OF EVENTS 
4 
DISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN 
ENDOGENOUS AND EXOGENOUS 
ENDOGENOUS EXOGENOUS 
4 4 
FLEXIBILITY OR MANEUVERABILITY 
4 
UNCONTROLLABLE CONTROLLABLE 
COMPARISON BETWEEN 
P L A N N E D AND ACTUAL 
CONVERTIBILITY OF 
RESOURCE INTO FLEXIBLE 
MEANS OF E X C H A N G E - C A S H 
(5) AVAILABILITY OF 
ALTERNATIVES 
FIXITY OF 
RESOURCES 
OPERATING 
RESULTS ' 
EXTRAORDINARY 
RESULTS 
WITH OUTPUT: VARIABLE AND FIXED 
COSTS AND REVENUES 
WITH INPUTS (MATERIALS, LABOR, ETC.) 
WITH ACTIVITIES (PRODUCT LINES, 
SEGMENTS OF FIRMS, GROUPS OF 
PRODUCTS OR SERVICES, ETC.) 
WITH FUNCTIONS (MANUFACTURING, 
SELLING, ADMINISTRATIVE, ETC.) 
ETC. 
MANAGEMENT'S 
FORECASTS 
OF CASH FLOWS 
4 
ASSESSABILITY OF 
MANAGERIAL ABILITY 
TO FORECAST 
4 
COMPARISON 
BETWEEN FORECASTS 
AND ACTUAL EVENTS 
(7) MARKET 
PRICES 
(3) COMMUNICATION OF 
PLANS THROUGH THEIR 
EFFECTS ON EXPECTED 
CASH FLOWS 
PROCEEDS IF SOLD 
OR DISPOSED OF 
(4) RECORD 
OF ACTUAL 
EVENTS 
(3) RECORD OF FORECASTS 
(4) RECORD OF ACTUAL 
EVENTS 
(5) COMPARISON WITH 
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 
(6) RECORD OF ALTERNATIVES 
AS OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
SYSTEMATIC DISTINGUISHABILITY 
BETWEEN EXPECTED 
AND UNEXPECTED RESULTS 
EFFORT NEEDED TO 
S E L L OR TO DISPOSE OF 
SELLING COSTS 
EXTENT TO WHICH 
RESOURCES ARE 
SPECIALIZED 
(6) RECORD OF 
ALTERNATIVES AS 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
(7) MARKET EXIT 
VALUES 
ADJUSTMENT 
COSTS TO 
CHANGE NATURE 
OR USE OF 
RESOURCES 
iv 
ASCERTAINABILITY OF 
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN 
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
(1) MARKET EXIT VALUES 
D E P E N D E N C E OF 
UTILIZATION OF 
RESOURCES ON OUTPUT 
MARKETABILITY 
ALTERNATIVE USES 
OF RESOURCES 
(7) MARKET EXIT VALUES 
PROVIDING 
INFORMATION ABOUT 
T 
* T H E N U M B E R E D ITEMS INDICATE R E C U R R E N C E IN T H E H I E R A R C H Y . 
T H A T IS, T H E Y A R E D E R I V E D F R O M M O R E T H A N O N E O B J E C T I V E O R S U B - O B J E C T I V E . 
COSTS (INCLUDING 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS) 
OF HARMFUL 
SIDE EFFECTS OF 
OTHERS ACTIVITIES 
COSTS (INCLUDING 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS) 
OF AVOIDING 
HARMFUL SIDE EFFECTS 
OF OTHERS' ACTIVITIES 
COSTS (INCLUDING 
OPPORTUNITY COSTS) 
OF PREVENTING 
HARMFUL SIDE EFFECTS 
OF FIRM'S ACTIVITIES 
plans successfully is an indicator of future performance and therefore repre-
sents important input to the prediction process, Further, information about 
management's particular plans and their results provides insight into risk-
taking tendencies of management and, therefore, the future likelihood of 
engaging in risk-taking activities. Thus, the ability to identify potentially 
useful information sources can enhance the predictability of relevant events. 
This is indicated as one of the sub-objectives emanating from the predict-
ability and comparability objectives in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6. 
Controllability is only one dimension that could facilitate the identifiability 
of potentially useful sources (through indicating, for example, that manage-
ment is potentially a more useful force for predicting the endogenous factors 
under its control than for predicting the exogenous factors outside its control). 
Other dimensions may also make identification of the more competent 
sources for providing information on future events possible. For example, 
among exogenous factors, different information sources have different de-
grees of usefulness and competence in providing information about relevant 
events. Interest rate fluctuations, the money reserve, and credit terms are 
factors; information concerning them is probably best obtained from the 
Federal Reserve. Information on the availability of raw materials and future 
prices, on the other hand, is probably best obtained through observing 
trends in the supplying industries. However, while other dimensions could 
be identified, only the controllability dimension is shown in Figure 6 since it 
serves to indicate a major dichotomy between the exogenous and the endo-
genous variables. 
The distinction between the exogenous and endogenous variables leads 
(as shown in the hierarchy) to the identification of management as the most 
competent source for predicting endogenous variables. Since users are 
interested in expected cash flows and their uncertainty, management fore-
casts of endogenous variables can be communicated by assessing the endo-
genous effects on future cash flows accruing to the firm.27 
2 7 While there are many ways for managers to communicate future endogenous 
events, the forecasts of cash flows by management were chosen in the hierarchy 
because: (a) such forecasts provide a quantif ication of the endogenous variables 
in dollars and (b) since the effects on cash flows will depend on the assumptions 
implicit in management's forecasts with respect to exogenous factors, such assump-
tions would be reflected through the forecasts of the total cash flows. These 
assumptions could also be explicitly stated when management provides its cash 
flow forecasts. It is important for users to know these assumptions, since if they 
are considered unrealistic, the quantif ication of the endogenous effect on the cash 
flows can then be modified. By communicat ing future endogenous events via their 
effects on cash flows, an aggregate measure could be provided if so desired. 
Provision of management's assessment of endogenous variables through forecasted 
cash flows certainly does not exclude other ways of communicat ing this information. 
Further research is needed to point out the better alternative means. For a recent 
suggestion to communicate management's probability distribution of forecasts con-
dit ioned upon different expectations with respect to exogenous variables, see Amir 
Barnea and G. Joseph San Miguel, "The Relevance of Earnings Forecasts" (Unpub-
lished manuscript, New York University, 1973). 
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The best source for predicting the exogenous factors is probably the 
market itself. It has already been indicated that different sources could be 
of different competence or reliability in predicting exogenous factors. How-
ever, the research on efficient markets indicates that available information 
in a market (including information affecting exogenous factors relevant to 
the particular firm) is generally impounded in market prices (whether they 
are securities or other capital assets). Market prices, therefore, probably 
best reflect the effects of relevant exogenous factors on the firm. For ex-
ample, fluctuations in the price of a firm's output reflects anticipated changes 
in the demand for that output, which is an exogenous factor that is relevant 
to the firm. Similarly, fluctuations in the market prices of inputs would reflect 
expectations with respect to changing conditions in the supplying industry 
and/or the emergence of competing inputs. This leads to the conclusion 
that market prices should be the source for predicting the exogenous factors 
that impinge upon the firm's activities, as shown in Figure 6 by the arrow 
extending from the exogenous branch of the exogenous and endogenous 
dichotimization. 
Proceeding from the endogenous branch and the need for management 
to communicate its cash flow forecasts, it is necessary for users to assess 
reliability of the future forecasts. To do this they need to be able to assess 
management ability to forecast with reasonable accuracy. To assess man-
agement ability to forecast, comparison between management forecasts 
and actual events must be made.28 Thus, the recording of forecasts and 
actual events (to be compared with forecasts) emerges as a desirable 
objective. To highlight the deviations of actual events from forecasted 
events, it is desirable to distinguish between expected and unexpected results 
of operations in the records. The quantification of unexpected events pro-
vides a record of management's "errors" and would be useful in assessing— 
through the observation of the magnitudes of these errors over an extended 
period of time—the ability of management to forecast within a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. Thus, Figure 6 indicates the systematic distinguishability 
between expected and unexpected results as an objective of accounting. 
Assessability of Managerial Performance. Since the firm's progress 
hinges primarily on management performance, the ability to assess this per-
formance is an important element in facilitating the predictability of the 
firm's flows and the comparability of these flows across firms. But to facilitate 
28 Thus, it could be argued that in the short run, managers could deceive users 
by deliberately communicat ing biased forecasts. But it should be remembered that 
managers who are likely to do so, when required to communicate forecasts, will 
probably "volunteer" biased forecasts in the absence of such a requirement. (As 
is well known, managers presently communicate forecasts in an ad hoc, sporadic 
fashion.) The requirement to incorporate forecasts systematically and periodically 
within the accounting system serves at least to deter biasing forecasts since it 
makes possible the subsequent systematic and periodic comparison of forecasts 
with actual events. 
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the assessment of managerial performance, it is essential to distinguish 
between controllable and uncontrollable events. Thus, the dimension of con-
trollability is important in two respects: one for the identifiability of useful 
information sources and the other for the assessment of managerial per-
formance. In the hierarchy (Figure 6) several situations are encountered 
where the same objective is derived from more than one higher level objec-
tive. This is indicated by numbers reflected in Figure 6. For controllable 
events, a comparison needs to be made between management's plans and 
actual results. The degree of management's success is assessed through 
both the soundness of their plans and the ability to meet these plans. Further-
more, both management's plans and actual results need to be compared 
with alternative plans and actions that were available to management. From 
the need to facilitate such comparison and evaluation can be deduced the 
objective of providing a record of alternative actions which, for example, 
could be reflected through the communication of opportunity costs. Thus, 
from the objective of assessment of managerial performance, two sub-
objectives can be deduced which have already been derived through other 
objectives in the hierarchy. One is the communication of management's 
forecasts and the effect of specific plans on these forecasts and the record 
of actual events to be compared with the actual forecasts. 
Flexibility or Maneuverability. Of primary importance for predicting the 
risk associated with the firm's cash flows (but also for assessing return) is the 
degree of flexibility or maneuverability that the management of the firm pos-
sesses in employing its resources. The more numerous the alternatives open 
to management for utilizing its resources, the greater its resilience to adverse 
environmental effects such as a decline in demand for its product. A 
systematic record of the alternative employments of available resources and 
possibly the resources' opportunity costs will facilitate the assessment of 
such alternatives. One readily available alternative for the firm's resources 
is disposal of them. Market exit values of the firm's resources quantify 
this alternative and are therefore an objective that is derived from the higher 
level objective of providing information on the availability of alternatives. 
Market exit values also satisfy two other sub-objectives that may be 
derived from the flexibility criterion. These are the convertibility of the re-
sources into flexible means of exchange and the extent to which resources 
are specialized. Clearly, the more convertible the firm's resources into cash 
and the greater the magnitude of cash that could be potentially received for 
them, the more flexible is the firm's management and the higher the degree 
of maneuverability of the firm's resources. If the market exit values of the 
firm's resources are small in their relative magnitude, a small number of 
alternative uses of these resources outside the firm is indicated, and therefore 
the utilization of the resources within the firm will be highly dependent on the 
marketability of the firm's specific output. The greater the extent to which 
these resources are specialized (in the sense of being thus dependent) the 
lesser is the degree of maneuverability available for management and the 
less flexible is management in using the assets. 
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Another factor that affects management flexibility is the degree of fixity 
of the resources. That is, the extent to which adjustment costs need to be 
incurred to change the use of the resources. The higher the adjustment costs, 
that is, the greater the fixity of the resources, the higher are the risks asso-
ciated with the firm's flows in case adverse environmental effects cause the 
demand for the firm's output to decline. The flexibility and maneuverability 
criteria are sub-divided in the hierarchy into four separate (although in effect 
interrelated) sub-objectives: 
1. Convertibility of resources into flexible means of exchange—cash: 
This sub-objective leads to the objective of providing market exit values as a 
reflection of the proceeds of resources, if disposed of, less the costs incurred 
to dispose of the assets. 
2. Availability of alternatives: From this can be derived the need to 
record alternatives, such as opportunity costs. A readily available opportunity 
cost of the firm's resources is their proceeds. Thus, market exit values are 
derived again as a sub-objective. 
3. Fixity of resources: From this attribute can be derived the need to 
communicate adjustment costs to change the nature of the use of resources. 
4. The extent to which resources are specialized: To reflect the degree 
of specialization, there must be some indication of the dependence of the 
utilization of resources on output marketability. Such a dependence could 
again be reflected through communicating the possible alternative uses of 
resources, e.g., through use of market exit values. 
From the objectives of flexibility and maneuverability two sub-objectives 
seem important. These are market exit values of the firm's resources and the 
opportunity costs of such resources, that is, a record of the resources' value 
in alternative uses. The numbers shown beside some of the sub-objectives 
in the hierarchy indicate recurrence in the hierarchy. In other words, they are 
derived from more than one objective or sub-objective. While greater re-
currence of the sub-objective in the hierarchy does not necessarily indicate 
that a particular sub-objective is more important, this is likely to be the case. 
Ascertainability of Divergences Between Social 
and Private Costs and Benefits 
To make possible the prediction of future divergences between social 
and private values (costs and benefits) as well as the possible alternative 
means of dealing with these divergences either at the individual or the gov-
ernmental level, information must be provided about both past and present 
divergences between social and private values. The information needs to be 
provided concerning the following: 
1. The actual cost to a firm (including opportunity costs) of harmful side 
activity engaged in by other firms or entities: Probably, the firm is in the best 
position to measure and quantify the costs here in the form of direct expendi-
tures or in the form of lost income that it incurs because of harmful externality 
102 
(such as pollution, noise, fumes, etc.) caused by another entity. It follows 
therefore that quantification of these costs for either private action or govern-
mental intervention is best made and communicated by the firm itself, pos-
sibly as a part of its accounting system. 
2. The costs of avoiding the side effects of others' activities: Certainly 
if the cost of avoiding the harmful side effects is less than the cost of the 
harmful side effects if not avoided, the cost of avoidance is relevant quanti-
fication of the social costs of the side effects (if the side effects only affect 
this particular firm). For any governmental action, this cost which can prob-
ably be best estimated by the affected firm is a necessary factor in deter-
mining the optimal action. 
3. Another relevant factor in determining the optimal corrective action 
is the cost which the firm causing the harmful side effect would incur to 
prevent it. The magnitude of this cost must be compared to the cost of the 
side effect to the affected firm as well as to the cost of avoiding that effect 
by the firm before a decision about the appropriate corrective action can be 
made. 
Summary 
Figure 6 shows the hierarchy of objectives and sub-objectives. Each 
sub-objective was derived from the analysis of information needed to obtain 
a higher level sub-objective in the hierarchy. While the derivation of objec-
tives and sub-objectives flows in the figure from top to bottom, i.e., from the 
highest level and the broadest objectives to lower level objectives, the formu-
lation of the high level objectives was at least in part based on how and for 
what purpose presently provided information is used. 
The importance of the framework depicted in Figure 6 lies in the way 
that objectives or sub-objectives are derived. While both benefit and cost 
considerations are required to identify objectives, we first concentrate on the 
identification of the more common benefits to be derived from accounting 
information. The benefits are based on pervasive normative decision models 
of major groups of users. Once the overall objectives are formulated, sub-
objectives and sub-sub-objectives are derived until different proposed ac-
counting formats and alternatives can be discriminated by assessing and 
evaluating them in light of the hierarchy of objectives. 
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